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I respond to the 4 commentaries by Awais Aftab & Kristopher Nielsen 
(A&N), Hane Htut Maung (HHM), Diane O’Leary (DO’L) and 
Kathryn Tabb (KT) under 3 main headings: “What is the BPSM really?” & 
Why update it?; “Is our approach foundationally compromised?”, and 
finally, “Antagonists or fellow travellers?”. 
 







First and foremost, I would like to thank the commentators––Awais Aftab 
& Kristopher Nielsen (A&N this issue), Hane Htut Maung (HHM this 
issue), Diane O’Leary (DO’L this issue) and Kathryn Tabb (KT this 
issue)––for the generous giving of their time to critical commentary of 
Derek Bolton & Grant Gillett’s proposed update of the Engel’s (1997) 
Biopsychosocial Model (B&G). I should say that while the book was co-
written, this Reply is written by DB only, so the text varies between plural 
‘we’ for the B&G book, and singular ‘I’ for the Reply. Our proposed 
update of the BPSM is in the spirit of trying to get things as straight as we 
can about the conceptual foundations of health, disease, and healthcare. I 
thank the commentators for their generous comments about the book and 
for their critiques on how things could be improved. There are some 
common and some distinctive themes in the critiques, and I will respond 
to them under 3 main headings: “What Is the BPSM Really?” & Why 
Update It?; “Is Our Approach Foundationally Compromised?”, and 
finally, “Antagonists or Fellow Travellers?”. I have aimed to include 
supplementary material (additional to what is in B&G) where relevant. 
 
THE BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL MODEL OF HEALTH AND 
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1. What Was or is the BPSM Really? And Why Update It? 
 
1.1. Was Engel Interested in Causes? 
 
A&N highlight that biopsychosocial causation, while the main problem in 
B&G, was not Engel’s main problem, indeed they suggest that it may not 
have been one of his problems at all (p. 7). At one level, this is about 
terminology; “causation” is semantically linked to many other expressions 
in the health sciences and therapeutics such as “factors” and “influences”. 
So for example, Engel’s (1977) list of what the biomedical model fails to 
take into account includes, quoted by A&N (p. 8-9): “for some conditions 
such as schizophrenia and diabetes, the effect of conditions of living on 
onset, presentation and course”––and we take this to refer to causal risks 
for onset and risk/protective factors (causally) affecting course, putting the 
issues squarely in the areas of epidemiology and clinical therapeutics. 
Another connected example, A&N propose that:  
 
The matters that preoccupy Engel are more to do with 
psychosocial influences in the form of illness interpretation and 
presentation, sick role, seeking or rejection of care, the doctor-
patient therapeutic relationship, and role of personality factors 
and family relationships in recovery from illness, etc. (Aftab 
and Nielsen this issue, 9)  
 
But presumably “influences” = something like “make a difference to” = 
“has a causal role in”.  
 
A&N present a convincing case that one of Engel’s main and general 
concerns was to bring many aspects of the psychological, social 
dimensions of illness including the doctor-patient relationship within the 
realm of medical and scientific inquiry. I agree with this, but suggest that 
this aspiration relies on the working assumption that these dimensions are 
causally relevant to health outcomes of interest. This is because science, 
so far as I understand it, is basically concerned with causes, and this is 
especially so for the applied sciences that aim to make a difference. To put 
it briefly, healthcare will take an interest in e.g. subjective accounts of 
illness if it makes a difference to something relevant, e.g. to agreement on 
whether there is a need to treat, and how; or will take interest in social 
context of living if it makes (or might make) a difference to e.g. falls at 
home and emergency admissions; or an interest in the quality of doctor-
patient communication if it affects continuing trust, attendance and 
acceptability of treatment; and so on. As I read Engel, much of what he 
says on this issue was with the intention of rejecting the dichotomy 
between medicine as science and medicine as ‘art’ (Bolton 2020). 
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However, this project relies on psychosocial/interpersonal factors making 
a difference to relevant health outcomes. In other words, this strand of 
Engel’s BPSM is the proposal that the causal processes (factors or 
influences) involved in disease and healthcare are not limited to the 
biological, but involve the whole person in their social/interpersonal 
context, and, as such, they are amenable to scientific enquiry. 
 
1.2. Was the BPSM Ever a Model? 
 
A&N reiterate the criticisms of Nassir Ghaemi and others to the effect that 
the BPSM is not a model and is of no clinical or scientific value (p. 10-11). 
I don’t want to insist that it is a model. It is probably no more of a model 
than the model with which Engel contrasted it, the biomedical model 
(BMM). Both expressions, and probably any others that summarise 
complex foundational issues in a word or two (such as also ‘biological 
psychiatry’, or ‘phenomenology’) lend themselves to various kinds of uses 
ranging between slogan-like and substantially theorised, with being a 
shorthand for a theory somewhere in between. A theorised version of the 
BMM would include core concepts and principles of the biomedical 
sciences, along with basic research and therapeutic paradigms. A theorised 
version of the BPSM would be the same for the biopsychosocial sciences, 
and this is what we attempted in B&G. We defined some core ontological 
and causal features of the three relevant domains and their interactions 
(contrast the BMM that has only one relevant domain), illustrated by some 
new paradigmatic biopsychosocial health-related pathways, such as those 
involving chronic stress and pain perception. We emphasised the theory of 
causal interactions between the three domains, because they are 
traditionally so problematic, as well as because causal explanation is 
central to science and its ontology. 
 
A&N repeat Nassir Ghaemi’s charge that the BPSM helped everybody to 
win, linked to the fact that it had no substantial scientific content (p. 10).  I 
suspect there may be a difference here in the way that the BPSM has played 
out in the US and the UK. While in the US there may have been a tendency 
to use the BPSM as a way of being inclusive and open-minded about causes 
and cures, the more usual perspective in the UK seems to have been that 
the BPSM is more a matter of empirical data from particular studies, for 
example in social epidemiology and studies of stress (see e.g. White 2005). 
Certainly UK colleagues of mine showed some surprise at Nassir Ghaemi’s 
interpretation of the BPSM and one UK reviewer, Julian Leff, did 
implicate UK/US differences (Leff 2010). This issue is probably linked to 
the history of “pluralism” on which more below in section 3.3. 
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1.3. Something’s Wrong Somewhere However 
 
Insofar as the BPSM was or has been used as a half-baked attempt at a 
model that served mainly to reduce uncertainty and make everybody 
happy, then by all means it doesn’t warrant updating, just exposing and 
moving on. This view, however, does not sit well with the popular proposal 
that, nevertheless, it serves a valuable educational function, endorsed 
(though with apparent ambivalence) by A&N (pp. 11-13).  
  
It seemed to us when we embarked on B&G that it was no good at all 
having these three propositions all being endorsed together: 
 
(1) BPSM is the most popular model (often observed, 
including by HHM is his opening sentence “The [BPSM] 
(…) is perhaps the most widely accepted model of health 
and disease in contemporary medicine.”) 
 
(2) However, it is philosophically, scientifically and clinically 
useless––not a model at all 
 
(3) However, it’s useful in education   
  
The combination of these three positions in the literature seemed to 
demand some work; doing nothing with the conjunct (1) & (2) & (3), as 
we saw it, was not an option. 
 
If (2) is correct we need to abandon (1) & (3) ASAP; or we accept and 
retain (1) & (3), and refute or remedy (2)––and it was in this spirit of this 
second option that we undertook to update the BPSM.  
 
1.4. Engel’s Vision and the Value of the BPSM    
 
At the beginning of her paper, KT uses a metaphor of psychiatry being 
buffeted about by centrifugal and centripetal forces, adapted from Scott 
Lilienfeld’s paper (2014) on the DSM-5, and recognizes the potential value 
of the BPSM as providing a unifying, ‘centripetal’ force (pp. 7). KT goes 
on to discuss centrifugal forces in psychiatry including specialisms, by 
condition, by profession, by tradition and orientation. Importantly, there is 
sometimes conflict between specialisms, potentially leading to confusion 
for end users. The problem gets bigger when splitting occurs, when one 
side doesn’t envisage the other, when there is no perceived whole, whether 
this be a person, healthcare, or health science. Centripetal forces, by 
contrast, see a conceptual unity, replacing splitting by something more 
holistic, and KT sees Engel’s (1977) BPSM as, perhaps, the most notable 
Derek Bolton: Response to 4 commentaries 
 
 9 
centripetal project (loc. cit.). I agree with that, and would add that its 
biggest message in this regard is not so much centripetalism within 
psychiatry (though this is probably an implication), but centripetalism 
across healthcare as a whole, positing a unity and common involvement of 
somatic and psychological processes.   
   
Linked to its centripetal force, KT correctly observes that Engel’s BPSM 
project drew on the systems theory in vogue at the time (p. 10). I suggest, 
however, that this was not just a sign of a temporary fashion, but was more 
a foretaste, a vision of what was coming: the increasing use of systems 
theoretic concepts and principles within and across many fields. The 
systems theory approach is closely linked to the acceleration of inter-
disciplinary research and problem-solving programmes over recent 
decades, providing some general and integrating concepts and principles. 
In Margaret Boden’s typology of interdisciplinarity, the highest levels are 
‘generalising’ and ‘integrated’, involving a unified single theoretical 
perspective and integration around shared themes and questions (Boden 
1999; see also Strijbos 2010, and Committee on Facilitating 
Interdisciplinary Research, Committee on Science, Engineering, and 
Public Policy 2004).  
 
This is just what we were aiming at in B&G: a unified theoretical 
perspective and common themes (constructs and principles), relevant to 
health and disease, throughout the biological, psychological, and social 
sciences. We supposed that the BPSM could only be a truly 
interdisciplinary framework, able to accommodate the many kinds of 
factors now known to be implicated in health and disease, by having a 
common set of constructs and principles that operate within and between 
previously disparate domains. Further, we believed that, as Engel foresaw, 
the required set of constructs were those in systems theory, such as 
function, design, ends, feedback, communication/information, regulation, 
and control. Since the 1970s the systems theory approach has developed 
in many existing and new sciences, applied to functional structures, natural 
or artificial, from biology to engineering to models of social organisations, 
criss-crossing previous disparate domains, underpinning interdisciplinarity 
(see e.g. Strijbos 2010). 
 
In fact, in the relevant recent history of ideas, there is a direct line to be 
traced from Schrödinger’s new and original definition of life, used in B&G 
to characterize biology, to Engel’s (1977) paper, via von Bertalanffy’s 
General System Theory (1968). Schrödinger’s work was cited by von 
Bertalanffy, in turn cited by Engel as a key example of the then new 
systems approach. Originally proposed for biology, the new systems 
perspectives were fast extended to cover psychological and social systems, 
EuJAP | Vol. 17 | No. 2 | 2021  Book symposium The Biopsychosocial Model 
 10 
organised in hierarchies of complexity, from cells to societies. Engel was 
among those quick to recognise the relevance of these new systems 
perspectives to health, disease, and healthcare, along with contemporaries 
such as Alan Sheldon (1970), Ervin Laszlo (1972) and Howard Brody 
(1973). Engel used the name “biopsychosocial model” in his paper, 
explicitly announcing it as a new model for medicine, readily interpretable 
as an extension of biomedicine––and this is the name that caught on, to 
become now the most widely accepted model. This was a background 
reason for us wanting to retain the name “BPSM”: the belief that its 
intellectual history was substantial, valid, and visionary. 
 
By all means, along with the name came its accumulated baggage, and 
several colleagues and pre-publication reviewers advised that we jettison 
both––the name and its baggage––and propose an explicitly novel theory. 
However, as is well-known and noted above, the name BPSM is still a 
leading currency. We supposed that this points to the intellectual need to 
update it and validate the BPSM, rather than abandon it as intellectually 
vacuous, which is not only hard to square with its being educationally 
useful, but also, as suggested above, does not recognize its solid 
foundations. 
 
1.5. What Moves Healthcare Mountains? Metaphysics As 
Continuous with Science 
 
As noted above, KT discusses centripetal versus centrifugal forces in 
psychiatry, and sees the BPSM as a centripetal project, but her main 
concerns in her paper are the centrifugal forces that support the BMM, 
which she identifies as socio-economic-political (Tabb this issue, sec. 3). 
Given this reasonable assumption that such forces are important 
maintaining factors for the BMM, KT then reasonably infers that as such 
they are unlikely to be affected by a metaphysical argument, which she 
supposes to B&G to be.  
 
In response to this I would say that the argument in B&G is not 
metaphysical but is meant to be scientific; actually, more accurately put, 
the intention is to operate in the dynamic space where metaphysics and 
scientific theory, and hence also data, merge. In other words, B&G buys 
into the idea, common in much 20th century philosophy, that philosophy 
(as metaphysics) is continuous with science, construed broadly as 
empirical knowledge. I will not spend time on this complicated issue here, 
but references include Quine’s (1951) famous rejection of two dogmas of 
empiricism, and, in a different way, Lakatos’ (1970) highly sophisticated 
philosophy of science. Importantly, metaphysics so construed is not a 
permanent set of truths but changes from time to time and place to place. 
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It undergoes major transformations, shifts in core theory (in Lakatos’ 1970 
terminology) or paradigm shifts (in Kuhn’s 1962 terminology). This is 
what B&G is about, new (or relatively new) ideas in the life and human 
sciences that underpin the BPSM, such as Schrödinger’s new 
characterisation of biological organisms in terms of decreasing entropy, 
the appearance of code in biology, AI, cognitive psychology, embodied 
cognition, agency, recognition of social recognition and social status vs. 
social disqualification and exclusion as processes that affect health and 
disease.  
 
As this last example illustrates, interwoven with these deep theory shifts 
are new technologies and empirical findings, and it is these, I believe, that 
can move healthcare mountains––over time.  
 
For example, I once heard the opinion that Aaron Beck and colleagues’ 
decision to trial their new CBT for depression against meds, as being truly 
inspired, because, when the psychotherapy was found to outperform the 
pharmacotherapy (Rush et. al. 1977), it made the medical community sit 
up and pay attention. The data scored a reasonably direct hit on the 
biomedical model that envisaged biological causation only. The rest––the 
massively increased use of psychological therapies in healthcare systems–
–is recent history.  
 
Empirical work in epidemiology has also been critical in showing the need 
for a broader biopsychosocial model. The new social epidemiology has 
shown that various forms of social exclusion, not only from biological 
necessities but also exclusion from psychological and psychosocial 
necessities, such as recognition, security, and civil rights––is bad for your 
health.  
 
Here are some other, emerging candidates of research programmes closer 
to core biomedicine than the examples above, in cardiology and surgery. 
In cardiology, studies suggest that about three quarters of patients referred 
to rapid access cardiology clinics have non-cardiac chest pain or other 
symptoms, while, or but, commonly there is no management protocol for 
these patients and they are discharged, often to seek assessment or 
treatment again later (Tenkorang et al. 2006; Sekhri et al. 2007; Debney 
and Fox 2011; Chambers et al. 2014; Lenderink and Balkestein 2019). In 
surgery, there is increasing evidence that for some presentations dominated 
by pain, surgical procedures do not outperform placebo (Wartolowska et 
al. 2014; Jonas et al. 2015; Louw et al. 2017). These emerging findings 
appear in the context of new models of pain and subsequent new 
treatments. In brief, the perception and severity of pain, while typically 
localized in a specific part of the body, is now understood to be only partly, 
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and sometimes not at all, associated with local damage, but also involves 
higher cortical pathways processing information about the meaning and 
consequences of the pain for the person’s life, potentially modifiable by 
psychosocial interventions such as psychological therapy and neuroscience 
education programmes (Quartana et al. 2009; Edwards et al. 2016; Andias 
et al. 2018). Bearing in mind that pain and associated distress and 
impairment of functioning are major drivers of service use, these emerging 
findings are of potential massive interest to healthcare provision and health 
economics. 
 
To sum up, if the question is posed: what brings about major shifts in 
practices and great institutions such as healthcare?––then the answer is 
going to be complicated. Same goes for a closely related question: what 
kinds of factors are barriers to change? KT notes that major factors 
maintaining the BMM include social, cultural, economic and professional 
interests, noting that Engel said as much, and then infers that metaphysical 
considerations are unlikely to move such things. This inference looks 
completely right, if ‘metaphysics’ is understood as an exercise in the 
academy, in departments of philosophy, divorced from scientific theory 
and data. But B&G never intended this. We see the move towards a 
biopsychosocial framework in the health sciences, therapeutics, and 
epidemiology as being fundamentally a scientific paradigm shift (or series 
of interconnected paradigm shifts), driven by deep theory changes in 
combination with new empirical data. It may be that, as indicated 
previously (sec. 1.2.), interpreting the BPSM as a scientific project––in the 
broad sense including deep theory, new technologies and empirical 
findings––as opposed to metaphysics, or ideology, could be an 
interpretation more common in the UK than in the US. 
 
KT argues for the importance of bioethics in advocating for improvements 
in healthcare (Tabb this issue, sec. 4) and many of her points I would agree 
with. I would add, however, that commonly the choice between two 
courses of action is based not only on the values assigned to the possible 
outcomes, but also on data-sensitive beliefs about how these outcomes are 
best likely to be achieved. Especially, whether a biomedical approach is 
the best way forwards or a biopsychosocial approach, or just psychosocial, 
will depend partly on what outcomes are desired, but also on empirical 
evidence about probabilities of how best to achieve them. This applies at 
every level, from choice of individual treatment, to choice of population 
level prevention programmes (options include doing nothing), to decisions 
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2. Is Our Approach Foundationally Compromised? 
 
Having outlined above the intended rationale, purpose and method of 
B&G, the question arises whether and how far it worked out. The 
commentators present several major challenges to the B&G project. 
 
2.1. Muddle about Dualism? 
 
DO’L proposes that the BPSM always has been contradictory because on 
the one hand it separates the biological and the psychological, while on the 
other hand it rejects dualism, fudging this by inadequate definition of 
dualism, in the original and in B&G (pp. 8-10). She proposes that this 
contradiction is already in the BMM, and it transfers to the BPSM. She 
notes the complexity and multiple interpretations of key terms involved in 
defining dualism, physicalism, and reductionism (pp. 9-10).  
    
We supposed in B&G, staying close to Engel’s text, that he charged the 
BMM with being dualistic and committed to physicalistic reductionism. 
We interpreted this as meaning, briefly, that BMM is committed to 
ontological dualism and causal-explanatory reductionism, i.e., to the view 
that body and mind are ontologically distinct, but that all causing takes 
place at the physical level, especially that there is no causing of bodily 
events by mental events. This interpretation involves no contradiction 
between dualism and physicalist reductionism. There would be a 
contradiction in affirming both dualism and physicalist ontological 
reduction, but we don’t interpret BMM as being ontologically reductionist, 
only causal-explanatory reductionist. The contrast is then with the BPSM, 
which is not explanatory reductionist, but envisages causal interactions 
within and between all of its three levels or domains. By all means it would 
be possible then to maintain that the three levels or domains were all 
ontologically separate, but then good luck with trying to make sense of 
causal interactions between them. Rather, the coherent shift is to suppose 
that causal interactions between the three levels of domain is possible 
because they are in the same ontological space, and hence our proposal that 
BPSM embraces the current science of embodied and embedded mind, as 
well as health and disease relevant aspects of the social sciences and the 
environmental sciences.    
 
2.2. Clinical Utility and the “Psychosomatic” Conditions 
 
DO’L goes on in her commentary to discuss the clinical utility of the 
BPSM, especially but not only for conditions that expose the unhelpful 
effects of dualism on healthcare, namely the so-called “psychosomatic” 
conditions (pp. 15-16). She expresses approval for aligning the BPSM with 
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evidence-based medicine. In B&G we supposed this to be now the obvious 
place to look for clinical guidance; substantial evidence from clinical trials 
and systematic reviews is available to us, unlike to Engel when he 
formulated the BPSM. On the other hand, DO’L criticizes B&G for placing 
too much faith in clinical guidance (p. 14). However, we had no intention 
of suggesting that clinical decision-making can be read off from clinical 
guidelines alone, the evidence for which is always partial, provisional, and 
selective (depending on the designs of the trials that have been done), 
without detailed history-taking and accounting for individual features of 
the presentation. So far as I know this crucial caveat is integral to EBM, 
even if there is a risk of it getting lost in practice.  
 
However, clinical practice and the clinical studies and trials that guide it 
are only as good as the nosology, and as noted above, DO’L focuses 
particularly on the important clinical categories linked to unhelpful 
dualism. While there been many nosological problems and debates within 
physical and psychological medicine, probably none have been as 
conceptually problematic as those about conditions that do not fit into 
either of those two kinds but fall somewhere in-between. These are the 
called-by-many-names ‘psychosomatic’ conditions, themselves 
comprising many kinds, and, as DO’L points out, accounting for a high 
proportion of health conditions (p. 14). People with these conditions, 
associated with varying levels of distress and impairment of functioning, 
can be transferred between general hospitals and neurological, psychiatric 
or psychological clinics, too often falling between them. One aspect of this 
unfortunate state of affairs is the dualism that has permeated healthcare, 
separating the biomedical study and treatment of conditions below the 
neck, roughly, with neurology, psychiatry and psychology between them 
sharing, more or less harmoniously, the brain and mind.  At the same time, 
the mental well-being aspects of physical health conditions have less 
visibility, and the same for the somatic aspects of psychiatric conditions. 
The continuing and probably increasing popularity of the BPSM belongs 
with a move towards more holistic healthcare. An important aspect of this 
are the new models of pain, distress and associated impairment, 
implicating central, not only peripheral, involvement––noted previously in 
section 1.5 as potentially contributing to changing healthcare practice.        
 
2.3. Is Biological Information Still Problematic? 
 
HHM and A&N both emphasise that the presumed normative, semantic 
characterization of biological information is a problematic foundation for 
B&G’s proposed update of the BPSM. There is a substantial philosophical 
literature which finds such a construct problematic in biology as opposed 
to psychology. As A&N (p. 18) remark, we are unlikely to settle this 
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problem here and now, but I will summarise some aspects of the rationale 
why B&G proceeded in this way, and address some of the criticisms they 
make.  
 
Firstly, in B&G we purposely made regulation and regulatory mechanism 
the primary characterization of what we suggest is a new kind of science 
in biology; rather than fronting the more familiar ‘information-processing’. 
This was partly to work around the familiar philosophical objections to 
biological information-talk, but it was also in the belief that biology has 
actually moved on since the original information-processing revolution 
that started in the 1950s/1960s following discovery of the genetic code, 
and is now more involved with regulation and regulatory mechanisms 
throughout biological systems. These processes and mechanisms are 
visible: physical-chemical processes stop/start, increase/decrease; caused 
by observable events that lend themselves to descriptions such as 
‘switches’ and ‘gates’ that e.g. increase or decrease concentration of 
catalysts. Information flow by contrast is a more abstract construct––you 
can’t see it––and the next step of supposing that what is ‘flowing’ has 
semantic, normative content, seems to turn this abstraction into a 
philosophical error (horror)––at least it does when certain philosophical 
assumptions about content are being made, on which more below. 
However, as this new biological science has developed, the concept of 
information is not, or does not have to be seen as, doing the conceptual 
heavy lifting; rather it appears rolled up in a whole family of 
interconnected constructs, along with coding, signalling, feedback, 
function, and so on. This is evident in, for example, the relatively new and 
rapidly expanding subfields of molecular biology, cell signalling and 
genetic regulatory networks. As part of these developments, the construct 
of information is itself changing, shifting towards programming and 
instructions, for e.g. building complex molecules, or for the operation of 
regulatory mechanisms. In these theory-shifts, it is less easy to identify 
information-talk as having semantic content. I mean, while it is easy to 
assume that information is supposed to have content ‘that p’, where ‘p’ is 
a proposition with a truth-value expressible in language, there is no 
corresponding easy assumption of true/false propositional content when 
‘information’ has the sense of instruction. Instructions are not true/false, 
though they can be e.g. normal/abnormal, or they can lead to the wrong 
result, in the circumstances, and they can be issued by the wrong agent.  
Here the reference is to the pervasive normativity in current biological 
models, evident in constructs such as dysregulation, error, mutation, 
correction, deception/mimicry, etc., but which is not best interpreted in 
terms of true/false semantic content. As to the grounds of this biological 
normativity, they are fundamentally to do with staying alive or dying, at 
the individual and/or species level.  
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Let me return to the point that biological semantic information or 
normativity is problematic only if certain philosophical assumptions about 
content/normativity are being made. HHM makes the criticism (p. 12), that 
while concepts of informational content and normativity are valid in the 
psychosocial domains, they are problematic in the biological domain at the 
sub-personal level. But apart from being familiar in folk usage, what is the 
metaphysics or science behind this claim? This is probably the same 
question as: what is the metaphysically acceptable literal meaning of 
‘informational content’ and ‘normativity’, such that application of these 
terms to biological, sub-personal processes is not literal, but only 
metaphorical? (A&N pp. 17-18; HHM pp. 13, 15). I suggest two, 
completely different justifications.   
 
One is the Cartesian or quasi-Cartesian, that would have semantic content, 
or intentionality and other related concepts, essentially tied to mind and 
consciousness. But this, I suggest, as suggested by the name of the original 
author, is just yesterday’s science/metaphysics; the current science/metaphysics is 
different.   
 
The other justification for the rejection of biological-semantic/normative 
talk is very different, but actually points distantly to the relevant deep shifts 
in science and metaphysics. It is the neo-Wittgensteinian argument, made 
for example by Hacker (1987), that such semantic/normativity concepts 
really belong to our activities using language, to language-games, i.e. 
briefly, to our sending/receiving signs enabling activities such as, to use an 
example near the start of the Philosophical Investigations, fetching and 
carrying stones for building (Wittgenstein 1953, paras. 2, 7). However, the 
argument in B&G is that signalling, communication, instructions, 
obtaining and transporting materials for building structures, is already 
happening in our biology––this, we contend, is the new biological science. 
I realise the magnitude of the alleged theory-shift here, which is basically 
from some idea of meaning (and cognates) as true/false representation of 
reality (hopefully, in Descartes), something so mysterious that only the 
conscious mind could do it, to the idea of meaning as communication, 
command and action. But this is the shift involved in the use of 
semantic/normative concepts in the biological as well as the psychosocial 
domains.   
 
It was proposed above that the grounds of this biological normativity are 
fundamentally to do with staying alive or dying, at the individual and/or 
species level. Putting the matter thus, however, could be interpreted as 
grounding biological normativity in our interests and concerns, as opposed 
to being in independent nature. But as against that, and of course, the 
emergence of life on Earth and its evolution over deep time much pre-dated 
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us and our concerns and scientific heuristics. The difference between life 
and death is in nature itself, independent of us, albeit in only part of nature–
–the biological part.   
 
However, Schrödinger’s theory of the biological goes deeper, seeing life 
as dependent on building and maintaining counter-entropic dynamic 
structures and functions––until such time as they break down and die. It is 
an essential of the part of the argument in B&G, aiming to track this deep 
theory in current biology/biophysics, that the regularities involved in such 
as genetic replication, genetic regulatory mechanisms, and cell signalling, 
can break down. This possibility of breakdown in regularities is an 
essential and distinctive feature of the new biology. The biological 
regularities are not immutable laws of nature, like the energy exchange and 
conservation laws of physics and chemistry, but could be otherwise, and 
can fail. This refers for example to Crick’s consideration of the possibility 
that the genetic code is a ‘frozen accident’, that the original allocation of 
codons to amino acids was “entirely a matter of ‘chance’” (Crick 1968, 
369-370). The accidental, non-fixed-law-like nature of the code is what 
allows break-down and error, as in genetic mutation, the condition of 
evolution, and of death.  
 
HHM proposes (pp. 13-14) inter-linked counter-arguments to those set out 
in B&G, summarised above, that would distinguish biology from physics 
(and chemistry) in a way that permits normativity. HHM proposes that 
Newton’s F=ma can lead to distinct predictions for experimental setups 
that are mathematically difficult to resolve. This may be true, but what is 
needed for to counter the argument in B&G is that F=ma can actually break 
down––and it can’t. Or, it is treated in such a way that it is not allowed to 
break down, as in Lakatos’ definitive account of scientific methodology 
(Lakatos 1970). Biological system-specific, information-based ‘laws’ 
always contain ceteris paribus clauses, as typically for the causal laws of 
the ‘special sciences’, unlike physics which has no such clauses, as argued 
by Fodor (1987). A statement of the sort that such-and-such genetic 
sequence codes for a particular protein––unpacked in terms of it producing 
such a protein under normal cellular operating conditions––fails to apply, 
breaks down, under abnormal conditions. No ceteris paribus clause 
appealing to normative conditions qualify F=ma.  
 
A connected line of thought responds to HHM’s connected argument (pp. 
14) that teleological language can be used to describe e.g. bodies tending 
to thermodynamic equilibrium. But the response here is the same as 
applied in the massive theory-shift from Aristotelian physics to the modern 
mechanics of Galileo and Newton, namely, that the new non-teleological 
mechanics did all the work needed to explain objects falling to the ground, 
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and teleological language added nothing of explanatory value.  In biology 
by contrast, the teleological language, the language of regulatory 
mechanisms and associated constructs, does a variety of explanatory work 
that is not done by physical descriptors: especially it picks out invariances 
among physical realisations involved with functions, tending towards 
ends; it identifies error and can be used to diagnose breakdown, possible 
repair, etc.   
 
A specific theme in the literature endorsed by A&N (pp. 15-16) is that 
Shannon information is enough for biology and is not semantic. In reply to 
this line of thought, I would reframe but basically repeat the arguments as 
above: Shannon communication involves a transmitter, a signal and a 
receiver; information transfer reduces uncertainty in the receiver and is 
prone to more or less ‘error’. These inter-systemic, normative concepts are 
quite unlike those in the energy-related laws of physics, and are applicable 




3. Antagonists or Fellow Travellers? 
 
As befits what we argued is a large-scale theory-shift, the BPSM has 
many fellow-travellers, in Engel’s original, and in any update now 
including B&G. Some among the former are mentioned in B&G, while 
some of the latter are cited in the commentaries as alternatives, 
considered below.  
  
3.1. The Interventionist Theory of Causation a Quick Fix? 
 
HHM argues (pp. 19-20) that the complicated and contentious 
causal/regulatory explanatory model proposed in B&G is not necessary to 
accommodate biopsychosocial causation because this can be done simply 
by using the interventionist theory of causation. He notes that we endorse 
this theory in B&G. However, I suggest, the interventionist theory is not 
enough by itself.  
 
When conducting an experiment, of some degree of stringency, or by 
observing a natural experiment, we measure certain variables and estimate 
the proportion of the variance in the outcome variable that can be explained 
by (or at least, is associated with) different factors, using regression. It is 
true that we can put any measured variables that we like into the regression 
as independent factors, and call them ‘biological’, ‘psychological’ or 
‘social’. Finding that the latter two account for significant variance in 
health outcomes is of course a major way in which epidemiological and 
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clinical trials have established the evidence base for biopsychosocial 
models of particular health outcomes of interest.  
 
The experimental method, however, is well known to be theory-free. So 
far, we have no idea of causal mechanisms, and also so far no theory of the 
constructs the variables stand for. In the present case, using the 
experimental method only, we so far have no idea how to theorise the 
biological, psychological or social––so far we just have variable names 
that we are saying are of these sorts. This is particularly important in this 
area, because of the centuries old presumptions of materialism and the 
consequent problematic status of psychological and social causes. In the 
context of this historical prejudice, apparent observations of psychosocial 
as well as biological causes are wide open to the reductionist pressure that 
would regard them as noncausal epiphenomena, which obscure the real 
material causes, e.g. in the brain or genes. Either way, whether we are 
happy with the untheorized observations, or whether we assume everything 
is really biological, we have no need to theorise or investigate the causal 
mechanisms by which e.g. psychological therapy or social exclusion affect 
health.   
 
In short, the experimental method on its own, philosophically expressed as 
the interventionist theory of causation, delivers only sparse theory-free 
empirical findings. No science is satisfied with this; it requires theory, and 
B&G aims to articulate it for the BPSM. As discussed in B&G, the most 
worked out theory of how social and psychological factors impact health 
invokes chronic social-psychological-biological stress, and the 
explanatory concepts are of the sort that we try to explicate, in terms of 
environmental and social resources, agency, dysregulation of metabolic 
processes, etc.  See also below section 3.3 on pluralistic approaches that 
include interactions between kinds of factor.   
 
3.2. Causal Selection 
 
HHM argues that  
 
the challenge when developing a defensible version of the 
[BPSM] (…) is not so much providing an adequate account of 
biopsychosocial causation, but providing an adequate account 
of causal selection. (Maung this issue, 21)  
 
He notes (loc. cit.) that “almost every event that is caused is the outcome 
of multiple causal factors (...). Nonetheless, we only consider some of these 
causal factors to be relevant in an explanation”. The issue is how we select 
which factors are causally relevant. HHM goes on to critically discuss 
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several accounts of causal selection in the literature, and in so doing covers 
a wide variety of considerations that may come into play in selection, 
ranging from empirical determination, to distinguishing between 
explanatorily relevant factors and background conditions, with the addition 
that this distinction is dependent on contexts, values, and interests, 
including ethical and political considerations, especially in healthcare (see 
Maung this issue, 21-23).     
 
In response to this critique, I would say that while B&G does not address 
the question of causal selection by that name in this way, with reference to 
the same literature, we do come at more or less the same issues from a 
different angle, and arrive at quite similar conclusions. In B&G we 
emphasise that empirical determination is necessary to define what causes 
affect an outcome, and for empirical study to occur at all, a problem of 
interest has to have been identified, this being, in health research, a health 
outcome of interest––i.e. typically, a condition of range of conditions, and 
within that, onset, course +/- treatment, and quality of life. Once a range of 
causes implicated in a particular health-relevant outcome of interest has 
been identified, then, given that healthcare is an applied science aiming to 
make a difference, at the individual or population level, the challenge is to 
identify a causal factor that is both of large enough effect and is modifiable. 
Many considerations apply in all these stages: in the first step, selection of 
a health outcome ‘of interest’, then also in decisions about what is a large-
enough, modifiable target for intervention (prevention or treatment). 
Considerations include e.g. individual/population burden of illness; 
healthcare costs; acceptability of interventions, available technology, level 
of resources, cost-benefit analyses, political priorities––all these of 
different sorts. While HHM and B&G take different approaches to this 
question of identifying relevant causes, I don’t see that they are wide apart 




HHM and A&N both consider the relation of the BPSM to various types 
of explanatory pluralism. HHM accepts that the BPSM accommodates or 
is compatible with explanatory pluralism (pp. 23-24), and I think that’s 
right. A&N by contrast view explanatory pluralism as alternative to the 
BPSM (p. 11). On the other hand, A&N acknowledge (pp. 11, 13) that 
B&G’s proposal that the content of the BPSM is in the specifics, is not that 
different to an explanatory pluralism that is guided by data on the specifics. 
They make the point (p. 11-12) that databased models of specific 
conditions, such as diabetes or depression, cannot be derived from a 
general statement of the BPSM, and that is of course correct and exactly 
part of the argument in B&G.  
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A&N go on to say (p. 12) that “establishing the psychological and the 
social as ontologically and causally real”, as proposed in B&G, “doesn’t 
help us with the question of how to best integrate the etiological factors in 
the form of a coherent explanation and how this should inform 
multidimensional approaches to treatment”. My response here is that the 
intention in B&G is to map out, at least some of, the key constructs and 
principles that can be used to construct integrated models of risks for onset, 
maintenance, and treatment of specific conditions.  
 
B&G considers two main models of integration: chronic stress and pain, 
which between them are major drivers of ill health and service use. As 
noted in the previous section, we highlight that current models of chronic 
stress are essentially biopsychosocial, involving the psychological aspect 
of down-regulation of agency (raising risk of dysregulation of agency, 
helplessness or inability to cope), interacting with the social aspect of 
excessive salient task demands in relation to low access to resources, 
linked to ‘low social status’, poverty, racism and other kinds of social 
exclusion, and the biological responses to chronic psychosocial stress that 
involve dysregulation of metabolic processes, compromising the immune 
system, creating risk for many kinds of ill health. The intention in B&G 
was to sketch out the constructs and principles employed in such models 
of complex biopsychosocial/environmental interactions. Another example 
considered in B&G in some detail was that of pain, discussed above in 
section 2.2., highlighting that current models implicate central 
neuropsychological processing including appraisals of agency/impairment 
as well as peripheral damage, or even in the absence of detectable sufficient 
peripheral damage. Again, the aim was to explicate the constructs and 
principles of these new models that integrate biopsychosocial/environmental 
factors.  
 
Overall, the intention was to go beyond any general statements to the effect 
that “it’s all very complicated involving lots of things and requiring lots of 
different approaches”, whether such a general statement is labelled as “the 
BPSM” or as “pluralism”.  The science has gone way beyond this and there 
is no need for such general statements in the clinic, or in education, at least 
not in courses where the learning outcomes include understanding the 
science or the ability to read scientific papers. We can use the general 
statements, but hopefully followed by advice that there are ongoing 




A&N compare and contrast the proposal in B&G with the 3/4E models of 
embodied cognition, sometimes called ‘enactivist’ theories. They note that 
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we endorse the 4E approach, as does HHM (p. 11), and they note many 
similarities between B&G and enactivism (A&N, pp. 14-15).  For me, the 
list of similarities is long and substantial enough to regard B&G’s version 
of the BPSM and enactivism as fellow travellers. A&N go onto contrast 
them, however, in favour of enactivism, citing its advantages over B&G in 
two respects (p. 19): 
 
(1) Enactivism does without the problematic concept of 
biological normative/semantic information 
 
(2) Enactivism explicitly bridges the natural-normative gap, 
by affirming that “all life shares an embodied concern (i.e. 
a self-perpetuating structure) for the continuation of self” 
(p. 19) 
 
On the second point (2), the intention in B&G is to affirm something like 
what A&N propose. Specifically, and as reiterated above in section 2.3., it 
proposes that the biological in nature has a normativity, grounded in the 
difference between life and death, adding the connected point that the 
regularities on which life depends are contingent and mutable, unlike laws 
of non-biological nature, and are liable to breakdown, eventually in dying 
and death, the end of the struggle to withstand increasing entropy.  
 
This raises the question of the relation between (1) and (2). Granting that 
enactivism envisages normativity in all life (2), why should it want to resist 
accepting normativity in biological information (1)? If all life exhibits 
normativity––grounded in the difference between life and death––what 
would be the problem in accepting that this normativity, so grounded, 
applies to biological information? It is not clear, in other words, that the 
first supposed advantage of enactivism sits well together with the first.  
 
The broader point here is that models of embodied cognition such as 4E do 
not necessarily reject the concept of information-processing, though they 
of course interpret it in the terms of the model, i.e. as tied closely to 
requirements for action, linked to needs and concerns. What is rejected is 
the old idea of information-processing as being processing of ‘mental 
representations’ (Newen et al. 2018) , i.e. as I understand it, representations 
of a ready-made, independent world, that has so far nothing to do with the 
embodied, active cognitive agent. There are many strands involved in 
models of embodied cognition (Newen et al. 2018), and only some take the 
radical and problematic step of eschewing the concept of information 
altogether (Carney 2020).  
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So far as concerns the BPSM, we supposed in B&G that accounting for the 
biopsychological (two of the three domains in the model) requires the 
model of embodied cognition, which also makes explicit its essential 
environmental involvement. Since the BPSM also requires linkages 
between the psychological and social, it is also necessary to emphasise that 
cognition, with action and agency, is constituted by interactions not only 
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